Basics of Pennsylvania Law: Double Dip, Part I

The concept of a “double dip” is logical and intuitive. If an income-producing asset has been awarded to a party in equitable distribution, the same asset cannot be counted as a source of income from which alimony may be paid. For instance, a pension in pay status cannot be counted as income for alimony purposes if it was also a marital asset that has been divided in equitable distribution. This concept has been recognized and adopted by the Pennsylvania courts at the trial and appellate levels. Butler v. Butler, 541 Pa. 364, 663 A.2d 148, 156 (1995)(professional goodwill); Diament v. Diament, 816 A.2d 256, 277 (Pa.Super.2003)(advance of marital assets); Miller v. Miller, 783 A.2d 832 (Pa.Super. 2001)(proceeds from sale of marital property); Rohrer v. Rohrer, 715 A.2d 463 (Pa.Super. 1998)(retained earnings of a business); Kokolis v. Kokolis, 83 Pa.D. & C.4^th 214 (Ally. 2006)(pension in pay status), affirmed, 927 A.2d 663 (Pa.Super. 2007); cf. McFadden v. McFadden, 563 A.2d 180 (Pa.Super.1989)(pension in pay status).

This post is the first of a series describing Pennsylvania case law concerning the double dip.

Berry v. Berry, 898 A.2d 110 (Pa.Super.2006).

The husband in this case was terminated from his employment as a partner in an accounting firm just weeks after the commencement of a support claim within a divorce action. Upon his termination, the husband received a distribution of his partnership capital account plus a cash severance payment equal to seven months’ base salary. The wife argued at the trial court level that neither of these items should be included in the husband’s income when determining his child support obligation. (The husband had secured other employment paying a salary sufficient to justify a Melzer analysis.) The trial court held that the capital account distribution and cash severance were income for support purposes. The wife appealed, prompting the Superior Court to vacate and remand the case.

The Superior Court held that the partnership capital account was marital property which should not have been included in the husband’s income because doing so would constitute a double dip.  On the other hand, the Superior Court held that the cash severance payment was strictly income. In its decision, the Court distinguished between money earned prior to the marital separation (in this case, a partnership capital account) and money acquired after separation (in this case, a severance payment). Since the partnership capital account was acquired prior to separation, it fell within the statutory definition of marital property. The cash severance acquired after separation did not.  The Superior Court held that the capital account was marital property while the severance payment was income. In both of its findings, the Superior Court refused to double dip.